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usually stamped on checks by collecting banks. In cases where the fraudulent
employee has the authority to sign checks the opposite result is reached under the
unamended N. I. L. so that it is the drawer of the checks who suffers the loss. 10
But as already pointed out, in the Prugh case it was Prugh Co. who suffered the
loss. This was because Missouri amended the N. I. L. 9-3 to read: "The instrument
is payable to bearer when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or nonexisting person
or to a person not intended or entitled to have any interest in it and such fact was
known to the person making it so payable or was known to his employee or other
agent who supplies the name of such payee." The effect of this amendment is to make
all of these cases end up as bearer paper cases because the guilty knowledge of the
fraudulent employee is imputed to the employer so that it will be always the intent
of the fraudulent employee that will control. If it does nothing more this amendment
settles this otherwise confused phase of the law and makes the decisions uniform. But
it does more than that; it puts the risk of loss on the party best able to prevent the
fraud. Neither the drawee bank nor the collecting bank have any reasonable way
to detect forged instruments. It seems unrealistic and arbitrary to put the loss on
these banks when it is the drawer of the checks who has put this fraudulent employee
in a position to perpetrate the deception. In most cases the employer is not negligent
in putting the employee in a position of trust so the net effect of the amendment is
to impose absolute liability on the employer, but this seems to be fairly includible
as a risk of the business enterprise which the employer can protect himself from by
fidelity insurance.
California has had no decision decided under its amended section as yet, but it
is nearly identical with the Missouri amendment. One 1950 case mentions the amendment but the court chose not to apply it to the case since the transaction occurred
before the amendment went into effect." The English Bills of Exchange Act of 1882
seems to be in accord with the policy of the amendment. 1 2 The proposed final draft
of the Uniform Commercial Code is intended to attain the same result as the amendment. 13
Geoffrey A. Steel.
FORFEITURE:

MURDER OF LIFE TENANT By REMAINDERM.&N.-In

a recent Vir-

ginia case,' a husband and wife, owning certain property as joint tenants, executed
a joint will whereby the survivor was to take all the property for life with power to
'Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn. v. Security First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles,
32 Cal. App. 2d 647, 90 P. 2d 335 (1939) ; Second Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh v. Guaranty Trust &
Safe Deposit Co. of Shamokin, 206 Pa. 616, 56 A. 72 (1903).
"Synder v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 70 A. 876 (1908) ; Cohen v. Lincoln Say.
Bank of Brooklyn, 275 N. Y. 399, 10 N. E. 2d 457 (1938).
"Calif. Mill Supply Co. v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn., 36 Cal. 2d 334,
223 P. 2d 849 (1950).
"Sec. 7(3) : "Where the payee is a fictitious or nonexisting person the bill may be treated as
payable to bearer." See, also, Bank of England v. Vagliano Bros., 1891 A. C. 107.
"Uniform Commercial Code, see. 3-405:
(1) With respect to a holder in due course or a person paying the instrument in good faith
an indorsement is effective when made in the name of the specified payee by any of the following
persons, or their agents or confederates:
(c) An agent or employee of the drawer who has supplied him with the name of the payee
intending the latter to have no such interest.
'Blanks v. Jiggetts, - Va. -, 64 S.E. 2d 809 (1951).
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dispose of the whole or any part thereof inter vivos, remainder to their issue in fee
simple. The wife died leaving the husband and a son. The husband subsequently
executed another will leaving all his property to his son. The son murdered his father
for the purpose of obtaining the property.
Section 64-18 of the 1950 Virginia Code provided: "No person shall acquire
by descent or distribution, or by will, any interest in the estate of another whom he
has killed in order to obtain such interest."
This suit was instigated by other heirs of the victim for the purpose of having
an adjudication that the son was barred from taking any of the property.
The court held that as the husband did not make an inter vivos disposition of
property of which the wife
the property, the son was entitled to possession of the
2
died seized and devised to him as a vested remainder.
The courts have frequently been concerned with the problem of whether the
murderer should be allowed to acquire and keep property by virtue of his crime. The
problem has arisen in a number of different forms, among them:
(1) Right of the murderer to take under the will of his victim.
(2) Right of the murderer to take by descent from his victim.
(3) Right of the murderer to take by survivorship from his joint tenant victim.
The basic problem and the arguments presented are substantially the same, but
the various courts considering the problem are far from harmonious in the results
they reach. All the courts are bothered by a basic moral repulsion against the idea
of the murderer being allowed to profit by his crime. Generally the courts have taken
three different positions.
The first view is that complete ownership of the property will pass to the murderer
in spite of his crime. This view represents the weight of authority, at least in the
intestacy situation, and it derives its strength from three main arguments. The first
is that to deny the property to the murderer because of his crime would be a punishment in addition to that received under his sentence, and it is the function of the
legislature and not the court& to fix the punishment for crime.3 Similarly, the second
argument is that such a denial would amount to a forfeiture for crime and this is
against our traditions and expressly forbidden by statute in most states. 4 The third

'The court did not consider the effect of the joint tenancy in the opinion. The well-established
rule is that there can be no severance of a joint tenancy by devise, since the right of survivorship
takes precedence over the will. (48 C. J. S., sec. 4, at 928.) Apparently a severance was found in
the execution of the joint will, it being considered an agreement to terminate the joint tenancy.
(Tiffany on Real Property, 3d ed., vol. 2, 425, 426; Hiltbrand v. Hiltbrand, 13 Cal. App. 2d
330, 56 P. 2d 1292 (1936).) A joint will is in legal effect the separate will of each of the persons
executing it as makers, the execution of the others being considered mere surplusage. (69 C. J. at
1295; In re Cole's Will, 171 N. C. 74, 87 S. E. 962 (1916).) When such a severance is found, the
husband and wife each own an undivided one-half as tenants in common. If such a severance were
not found, the wife's property would have gone to the father by survivorship, and the son, taking
under the later will of the father, would have been barred by the express terms of the statute.
The court did not spell out of what share of the property the mother died seized, and which the
son took as a vested remainder.
'Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 A. 637 (1895) ; 29 L. R. A. 145; Hagen v. Cone, 21 Ga. App.
416, 94 S. E. 602 (1917) [Heir].
,'Holloway v. McCormick, 41 Okla. 1, 136 Pac. 1111 (1913) [Heir]; Hagen v. Cone, 21 Ga. App.
416, 94 S. E. 602 (1917) [Heir-Uxoricide].
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argument is that the devolution of property is entirely controlled by the statutes of
descent and wills, and the courts are bound thereby unless there be an express exception for the murderer. It is stated that the power to declare the rule for the devolution
of property is vested in the legislature, and where no exception is made on account of
criminal conduct, the court is not justified in making one.'
The second view taken by the courts is that no title shall pass to the murderer.
The main basis for this view is the equitable doctrine that one shall not profit from his
own wrong. 6 Some of the cases have based the refusal to pass legal title to the murderer
on a reasonable interpretation of the statutes of descent and wills to the effect that
it could not have been the legislative intent to have these statutes operate in favor
of one murdering his ancestor or testator. 7 This view has found considerably more
support when the devisee has murdered his testator. It is argued that by depriving
the testator of the right to change his will in accordance with
his own volition, the
8
murderer has disabled himself from benefiting by that will.
The third view taken by the courts is that the murderer will be allowed to take
the bare legal title as constructive trustee for the other heirs or devisees. The theory
is that equity will impose a trust on the property because of the unconscionable mode
of its acquisition. 9
In the present case it is clear that the murderer is profiting from his own wrong
in two respects: (1) he has precluded the life tenant's exercise of his inter vivos
power of disposition, and (2) he has accelerated his remainder. But it would be a
manifest abuse of the judicial function to deprive the son of this property interest
because of a moral repulsion and a vague equity doctrine that one shall not profit
from his own wrong. The court would be imposing another judicial exception on the
statutes of descent and wills. This is an excellent example of what Dean Pound refers
to as "Spurious Statutory Construction."' 0 Furthermore, the court would be punishing the son in addition to his criminal penalty. True, there is a public policy against
murder, but the courts are not theological institutions. They can't take property away
from a person merely because he violates a public policy." Property rights are too
precious for that. The criminal code fixes the puni§hment for crimes, and the
demands of public policy are met by the proper execution of the criminal law. Public
2
policy doesn't demand forfeiture of property to buttress the criminal law.'
Also, almost all states have statutes which provide that no conviction of any
person for a crime works any forfeiture of property except in cases when the forfeiture
is expressly provided by law.' 3 In this case, by the terms of his mother's will, the son

'McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112 (1906) ; In re Kirby, 162 Cal. 91, 121 Pac. 370
(1912) [Heir]; 16 Am. Jur., Descent and Distribution, sec. 74-78; 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. 492.
8
Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908) [Heir-Uxoricide]; Re Tyler, 140
Wash. 679, 250 Pac. 456, 57 A. L. R. 1088 [Heir-Uxoricide].
'Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 206, 22 N. E. 188 (1889) [Devisee].
'Inre Wilkin's Estate, 192 Wis. 111, 211 N. W. 652 (1927), 51 A. L. R. 1106, 51 Am. Jur.,
Wills, 156 [Devisee].
9
Whitney v. Lott, 134 N. J. Eq. 586, 36 A. 2d 888 (1944) [Devisee].
1
Pound, "Spurious Construction," 7 Col. L. Rev. 379 (1907).
' 1 Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N. E. 838 (1935).
"2U. S. v. Milberger, 5 Wheat 76 (1820) ; Welsh v. James, 408 IlI. 18, 95 N. E. 2d 872 (1950)
[Joint Tenant-Survivorship].
"3 Cal. Pen. Code, sec. 2604; 12 Cal. Jur. 635; 23 Am. Jur. 600.

